



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

Top Secret

25X1



000/CE

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

30 March 1982

Top Secret

CO NIDC 82-074C

30 March 1982

Copy **402**

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret




25X1

Contents



25X1

Israel: *Begin's Prospects* 2




25X1

Special Analysis

South Africa - Angola: *Cross-Border Operations* 4



Top Secret



25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

25X1

ISRAEL: Begin's Prospects

The approval yesterday by the Knesset of an interim budget improves Prime Minister Begin's chances of remaining in office for the time being. The Knesset, however, also may vote today or tomorrow on a controversial religious bill and on financial compensation for Jewish settlers in the Sinai.

25X1

Comment: The proposed religious legislation is only in its initial stages, and its ultraorthodox supporters may not seek a vote if passage seems unlikely. Begin faces a tougher challenge on the sensitive compensation issue, which he would like to resolve to help reduce the possibility of violent resistance by the settlers to final withdrawal from the Sinai. The Knesset's spring recess begins on Thursday and lasts until early May, and Begin almost certainly will use the recess to renew overtures to three small parliamentary groups whose participation in the coalition would give him control of 66 seats in the 120-member legislature.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Cross-Border Operations

South Africa has waged its war against the South-West Africa People's Organization during the past year largely on Angolan territory. The South African military, operating from a buffer zone established after a major incursion last summer into southern Angola, has attacked SWAPO bases well inside Angola. South Africa's continuous presence in the area has prevented SWAPO from resuming its high level of activity of late 1980. Pretoria recently has acted to prevent the guerrillas from skirting the buffer zone to infiltrate Namibia and probably is now conducting another major operation deep in southern Angola.

The incursions in 1981 were aimed at destroying the guerrillas' infrastructure near the Namibian border and inhibiting future infiltration. The insurgents' dependence on Angolan transportation and storage facilities led the South Africans to abandon their policy of avoiding clashes with Angolan forces.

Moving Into Angola

Last summer Pretoria carried out its largest incursion since 1975. The operation was designed to punish Angola for its protection of SWAPO.

Virtually all of the 1,000 casualties were Angolans, and the enormous quantities of captured military equipment were primarily from Angolan bases. The destruction of radar facilities at Cahama and Chibemba was a warning to Angola and its Communist backers against any southward extension of the air defense net along the Mocamedes-Lubango-Matala line.

//South Africa has subsequently preserved a buffer zone by conducting reconnaissance missions, "hot pursuit" raids, and several followup operations. Small units regularly patrol to intercept SWAPO or Angolan units attempting to return.//

--continued

Top Secret

Top Secret

//Pretoria also has countered SWAPO's efforts to flank the buffer zone. Earlier this month, South Africa destroyed a new base near Cambeno in the mountainous area nearer the coast.//

//In an apparent warning to the guerrillas and to the Zambian Government, South Africa moved additional aircraft to Mpacha Airfield in the Caprivi Strip, once the primary staging base for operations against SWAPO bases in Zambia. The stationing of Mirage fighters at Ondangua Airfield suggests another major operation is under way.//

Relying on the Military Option

//Increasing the costs to Angola serves Pretoria's negotiating objectives. The South Africans believe that progress on related issues, particularly the Cuban presence in Angola, is a necessary component of any Namibian settlement.//

Despite its military successes during the last year, Pretoria's short-term political objectives have not been achieved. The number of terrorist incidents is down, but SWAPO's political strength in Namibia appears undiminished. The increased military pressure also has not made SWAPO and the Frontline States more compliant in the early stages of negotiations on Namibia.

Pretoria, however, probably will not abandon its emphasis on military operations for the sake of possible political progress on Namibia. The incursion it launched last November coincided with the arrival of Western Contact Group representatives in Luanda to initiate the current round of negotiations. The operation evidently under way will further complicate efforts to break the impasse in the negotiations over the electoral provisions for a constitutional assembly.

The South Africans have pointed to the killing and capture of Soviet advisers during the incursion late last summer, the downing in November of a MIG probably piloted by a Cuban, and the clash with Cubans in early January as evidence of Communist backing of the "total onslaught" against white rule.

--continued

Top Secret

Top Secret



25X1

Pretoria's announcement last week that all white males up to the age of 60 will be liable for military training and service in home guard units suggests that the South Africans are preparing for an extended conflict in Namibia and for defending against other regional security threats. In such an atmosphere, Pretoria may be increasingly unwilling to take many risks in pursuing a political settlement in Namibia.



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

Top Secret